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The old story, so often told, of a prominent Eastern newspaperman's
reply to the question of what the shares in his company were worth is
very apt:
"There are 51 shares," said he, "that are worth $250,000. There are
49 shares that are not worth a - -. "
The lot of the minority shareholder in a close corporation is not always
happy. Where the corporation utilizes simple form articles of incorpo-
ration containing only the mandatory provisions 2 and the predominant
contributor is given a majority of the voting shares, without restriction
by any shareholder or voting trust agreement, the predominant contrib-
utor will have virtually total control. It is axiomatic that a majority
elects the entire board no matter how many or few members it has.
Thus, that majority controls all corporate decisions including the distri-
bution or withholding of dividends, the election of all officers, and the
hiring and firing of all other personnel. It is important that all partici-
pants in the corporate venture recognize, at its inception, the ramifica-
tions of this majority control.
Typically when a corporation is formed each of the participants
desiring an active role will be given one. Thus, in a corporation of three
equal shareholders each will frequently be given a directorship and an
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. Yale, 1949; J.D. Colum-
bia, 1952; LL.M New York Univ., 1959.
1. Humphrys v. Winous, 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 NE 2d 780 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
2. The mandatory provisions are set forth in FLA. STAT. § 607.164(1). It should
be noted that, as will be discussed below, majority power may also result from a coali-
tion, even an informal or inadvertent coalition. For example, a husband and wife or
two relatives together may hold a majority of the voting shares, although each techni-
cally has a minority interest; or, two equal shareholders may each sell or give an equal
number of shares to a third person and whichever of the two the new shareholder sides
with will then have majority power.
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office. The lack of power of any one of the participants will not imme-
diately be apparent. It will become so only when the real nature of
majority power is understood. This lack of power of the minority be-
comes apparent when, as is typical, a dispute occurs in a corporation in
which the minority has previously been allowed some participation in
management.
As directors, the minority participants will have legal powers.
However, the well established caselaw rule of directorial autonomy, 3 in
the face of majority shareholder dictation, is largely a myth. In fact,
while direct interference in management may not be possible,, a major-
ity shareholder, albeit by more devious means, can generally achieve
the absolute operating control theoretically denied him by the law.
AN EXAMINATION OF MAJORITY POWER
The following example illustrates the control that the majority
shareholder might wield. Let us assume that a corporation has three
shareholders, A, B, and C. A owns a majority of the corporation's
shares, and B and C own the rest. Assume further that all three are
represented on the board and split the offices of president, secretary,
and treasurer. Obviously, this is a typical close corporation arrange-
ment where the relations of the parties are amicable, initially.
If A wants the corporation to take a certain action such as enter-
ing into a long-term employment contract with A's son, D, this is a
matter for the board of directors. A can obviously be outvoted by B
and C, but can A, nonetheless, get his way? He could, of course, offer
to buy B's and C's shares. Possibly overassessing their power and the
value of their interest, B and C might try to blackmail A into a higher
3. The leading case is Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v.
Cunninghame, [19061 2 Ch. 34 (Ct. of Appeal). See also Finn Bondholders, Inc. v.
Dukes, 157 Fla. 642, 646, 26 So. 2d 802 (1946); M. GORDON, FLORIDA CORPORATIONS
MANUAL § 10.03 (1974). See, generally, as to agreements affecting directors, H. HENN,
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 393 et seq. (2nd ed. 1970). Although FLA. STAT. § 607.111(1)
and FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2) allow incursions on board powers, they both indicate ad-
herance to the general rule in the absence of compliance with their special terms.
4. FLA. STAT. § 607.111(1) and FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2). Although FLA. STAT. §
607.111(1) technically only requires a provision in the articles to implement the excep-
tion to board power, no sensible attorney would insert such a provision without ap-
proval of at least all the initial participants.
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price than their shares are realistically worth. In any event, the pro-
tracted negotiations might make this an undesirable solution.
An obvious means of getting his way is for A to wait until the
annual shareholder meeting, and then vote in three directors of his own
choice that are "friendly" to his plan. Barring a contrary shareholder
agreement or high vote provision' in the articles of incorporation, A
can elect the entire board. Even if the corporation has cumulative vot-
ing,' he can still elect two out of the three directors and thus get his
way. 7 This, of course, has the disadvantage, from A's point of view, of
having to wait till the next meeting. However, this wait may not be as
long as one might assume since A may have the power to advance the
date of that next meeting.'
In addition to these two obvious methods of achieving his goal, A
ordinarily will have available at least one of the following methods for
guaranteeing that his demands will be met almost immediately: (1) re-
moval of the directors who oppose him; (2) increasing the number of
directors and "packing the board"; (3) decreasing the number of direc-
tors to get rid of the opposing members; (4) shortening the duration of
5. FLA. STAT. § 607.094(2). Assuming a quorum is present, the norm is that the
affirmative vote of the majority of the shares represented at the meeting and entitled to
vote shall constitute the act of the shareholders. However, the statute provides that a
number greater than a majority may be required if the articles of incorporation or
bylaws of the corporation so provide.
6. In cumulative voting each shareholder may take a number of votes equal to
the number of shares owned times the number of directorships to be filled and cast all
of them for one candiate or distribute them among several as he chooses. D.F. VAGTS,
BASIC CORPORATION LAW, 825 (2nd ed. 1979).
7. Under the Williams formula for determining the effectiveness of cumulative
voting (WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS, 40-46 (1951)), one multiplies
the number of shares represented at the meeting times the number of directors desired
to be elected, divides by the number to be elected plus 1, and adds 1 to the result. This
gives the number of shares needed to elect the desired number of directors. Under the
formula, if 3 directors are to be elected, and A has 51% of the shares it becomes clear
that he can elect 2 directors. See also LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 376 (2nd ed. 1971).
8. FLA. STAT. § 607.084(2) provides for an annual meeting of shareholders to
elect directors "on such date and at such time as may be stated in, or fixed in accor-
dance with the bylaws." It also provides for a court-ordered election if the meeting is
not held within any 13-month period. It does not, however, require that a full year
elapse between annual meetings. A New York case held under a similar statutory pro-
vision that the date of the annual meeting could be advanced. Matter of Mansdorf v.
Unexcelled, Inc., 28 A.D. 2d 44, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1967).
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the corporation; or (5) increasing his power as an officer to enable him
to do what he wants without director approval. In some jurisdictions he
may even be able to abolish the board and retain management power
to himself as a shareholder? The success of any of these methods is, of
course, contingent upon A's power to call a special shareholders' meet-
ing or approve the changes without one. This is, however, a power
which he will frequently possess by virtue of his office or by virtue of
statute.10 The mere threat of its utilization will normally be sufficient to
coerce the oppositon to give the majority shareholder his way. A fur-
ther threat to the minority may be very effective. The majority share-
holder may under the by laws have been given the power to remove
non-consenting directors from their positions as officers." The votes of
directors subject to such action may well be controlled by this threat to
their compensation and status in other roles.
9. Florida may possibly be one of these. FLA. STAT. § 607.111(1) provides:
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the
business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of, a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in the
articles of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the articles of incorpo-
ration, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors
by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such per-
son or persons as shall be provided in the articles of incorporation.
An amendment of the articles might be able to accomplish this, since this is a provision
which could have originally been included (FLA. STAT. § 607.177(1)). Although the di-
rectors must usually authorize an amendment (FLA. STAT. § 607.181(l)(a)), the share-
holders may enact such an amendment without such director approval, at a meeting
for which notice of the changes is given (FLA. STAT. § 607.181(4)), by majority vote.
FLA. STAT. § 607.181(l)(c). A majority shareholder, even though not an officer, has
power to call a special meeting to adopt the amendment. FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b).
Although this conflicts with the spirit of FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2) which only authorizes
director-infringing provisions where unanimous, it may be upheld, if Florida follows
the Delaware "independent validity" doctrine. (Even though an action would be im-
proper under one section of the statute, it is still permitted if it appears arguably
proper under another.) This, of course, represents a rejection of the "pari materia"
doctrine of statutory interpretation, and may not be followed in Florida.
10. See FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b). See also FLA. STAT. § 607.394(1), infra note
15.
11. Under FLA. STAT. § 607.15 1(1) the bylaws may provide for election of of-
ficers by the shareholders. If so, they may be removed by the shareholders. FLA. STAT.
§ 607.154(2). After removal of an officer, the vacancy thus created will, however, ap-
parently be filled by the directors unless the power to fill such vacancies is also reserved
to the shareholders. FLA. STAT. § 607.154(3).
4:1980 1
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DEVICES-FOR MAJORITY CONTROL
A number of the devices for majority control delineated above
may be available in Florida. Some are not:
Removal of opposing directors.
Although removal of directors for cause is recognized at common
law, removal without cause is generally not permitted. 12 This represents
the Florida common law rule;13 however, the current Florida statute,
like Delaware's," provides: "At a meeting of shareholders called ex-
pressly for that purpose, directors may be removed in the manner pro-
vided in this section. Any director or the entire board of directors may
be removed, with or without cause, by a vote of the holders of a major-
ity of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors. '"'5
Unless cumulative voting is provided for in the articles of incorpora-
tion"6 or there are provisions in the articles for class directors," A can
remove the uncooperative directors whenever he wants18 and fill the va-
cancies thus created with his own "puppets.""
12. FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. § 352 (Perm. Ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited FLETCHER].
13. Frank v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
14. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(k).
15. FLA. STAT. § 607.117(1). It is not completely clear whether the requirement
of Florida Statute section 607.117(1) for a meeting "called expressly for that purpose"
was meant to override the provisions of Florida Statute section 607.394(1) which gov-
erns actions by shareholders without a meeting. If the latter section can be utilized A's
task will be more simple.
Since A has the power to call a meeting (FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b)), and, in the
absence of special protective devices for the minority, his votes at the meeting will be
sufficient to remove the offending directors, it would seem safer to go through the
formality of holding such a meeting. See FLA. STAT. § 607.117(1). Removal without
cause is still restricted in many states. Petition of Singer, 189 Misc. 150, 70 N.Y.S. 2d
550 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Pilat v. Broach Systems, Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 88, 260 A. 2d 13 (Law Div. 1969);
FLETCHER §§ 352, 354.
16. FLA. STAT. § 607.097(4).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.044(l), 607.164(1)(d).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 607.117(2), (3), for the limitations.
19. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(6).
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Increasing the number of directors-"packing the board."
Florida statutes provide that the number of directors be fixed in
the articles of incorporation, in the bylaws, or in a manner provided in
those documents."0 Although power to amend bylaws is in the direc-
tors, "unless reserved to the shareholders by the articles of incorpora-
tion,""1 the statute continues:
Bylaws adopted by the board of directors or by the shareholders may be
repealed or changed, new bylaws may be adopted by the shareholders,
and the shareholders may prescribe in any bylaw made by them that
such bylaw shall not be altered, amended or repealed by the board of
directors.22
Although the statute is not completely clear that the shareholders have
the right to increase the number of directors unless they have reserved
all power over the bylaws or the number of directors has been fixed by
the action of the directors, the language suggests that the grant of
power to the directors was not intended to deprive The shareholders of
their usual power over the bylaws. Accordingly, A should be able to
succeed here as well. The result should be the same even if the number
of directors is fixed in the articles of incorporation.21 A can, therefore,
add two new directors to counter the votes of the two who oppose him.
However, unlike some other states, where the statute expressly
gives permission to amend the bylaws to grant the power to the share-
holders to fill such vacancies, 24 or expressly provides that such vacan-
cies will be filled by them,2 the Florida statute simply provides:
Any vacancy occurring in the board of directors, including any vacancy
created by reason of an increase in the number of directors, may be
filled by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors
though less than a quorum of the board of directors. A director elected
to fill a vacancy shall hold office only until the next election of directors
20. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(1).
21. FLA. STAT. § 607.081.
22. Id.
23. See text at notes 32, 33 infra.
24. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 705(a) (consol.) (McKINNEY's CoNsoL. LAWS
OF N.Y.).
25. For example, N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A § 6-5(3) (1968).
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by the shareholders."
No express exception for a contrary article or bylaw provision ap-
pears, and, accordingly, the shareholders may not have the power to fill
such vacancies. Needless to say, if the directors fill them, A will be in a
worse position than beforeY
Decreasing the number of directors.
A might try to reduce the number of directors to one, that is, him-
self. Again, in some states this device might succeed.2 However, the
Florida statute expressly provides:
The board of directors of a corporation shall consist of one or more
members. The number of directors shall be fixed by, or in the manner
provided in, the articles of incorporation. The number of directors may
be increased or decreased from time to time by amendment to, or in the
manner provided in, the articles of incorporation or the bylaws, but no
decrease shall have the effect of shortening the term of any incumbent
director.?
While this method will not accomplish A's purpose immediately, he
may use it as a means of giving himself complete control in the future,
by fixing the number of directors at one.
Shortening the corporation's duration.
The practical effect of dissolution can be achieved by amending
the articles of incorporation to set as the corporation's duration a date
about to expire. Florida statutes expressly allow an amendment "to
26. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(6).
27. If the shareholders do have the power to fill the vacancies despite lack of
express statutory authority, it is clear that A has the power to call a shareholder meet-
ing to do so because he owns over one tenth of the shares. (FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b))
In fact, it would appear that A will be able to act even without a meeting by virtue of
Florida Statute section 607.394(1).
28. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A § 6-5(1) (1968) which does not contain the express
restriction contained in FLA. STAT. § 607.114(1). See text at note 29.
29. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(1).
! 4:98
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change the [corporation's] period of duration. ' 3 In some states all
amendments of the articles of incorporation require prior board ap-
proval .3 In such jurisdictions this solution would be unavailable to A.
However, under Florida law "[t]he shareholders may amend the arti-
cles of incorporation without an act of the directors at a meeting for
which notice of the changes to be made is given." 32 Since A, as a ma-
jority holder has the power to call the necessary shareholder meeting,3
this method should succeed. Thus, the corporation's duration can be
fixed in the articles for a term about to expire immediately.
Increasing officer power.
If, as discussed above, A as a shareholder possesses the right to
amend the bylaws, he can increase his powers as an officer. The Florida
statute provide that "[aill officers . . . shall have such authority and
perform such duties in- the management of the corporation as may be
provided by the bylaws." 3 A bylaw amendment providing for election
of officers by the shareholders is also desirable3 since this will protect
A from removal by the board. If A is president of the corporation he
has the power, by virtue of his office, to enter into a number of transac-
tions, although possibly not the long-term employment contract hy-
pothesized.36 A may also have broad express powers if conferred on
him by the bylaws.37
Whether or not shareholders still retain the power to enact bylaws,
still in the absence of a provision in the articles reserving the right, 38 A
will have the power, as discussed above, to amend the articles to re-
serve that power to himself as a shareholder. He can then amend the
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.177(2)(b).
31. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A § 9-2(4)(a) (1974).
32. FLA. STAT. § 607.181(4).
33. FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b). See also note 15, supra.
34. FLA. STAT. § 607.151(2).
35. FLA. STAT. § 607.151(1).
36. FLETCHER § 566.
37. FLA. STAT. § 607.151(2). "All officers and agents, as between themselves and
the corporation, shall have such authority and perform such duties in the management
of the corporation as may be provided in the bylaws or as may be determined by
resolution of the board of directors not inconsistent with the bylaws."
38. FLA. STAT. § 607.081.
4:980 1
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bylaws to broaden his powers as president. It could be argued that such
expansion of officer power is an improper interference with board pow-
ers. The counter-arguments which should succeed, provided the
amended bylaws do not attempt to supersede board management, are
that all powers granted to officers are to some extent an encroachment
on board powers and that the statute expressly validates the grant. This
device will not prevent the board from later firing A's son if B and C
are allowed to remain members. However, if the president has the
power to enter into the contract, this may be possible only on pain of
the corporation's paying damages. Even if B and C escape liability for
causing the corporation to breach the contract, they may be discour-
aged from repudiating the contract since doing so will mean an injury
to them through diminution in the value of their interest in the
corporation.
Although sterilization of the board is permitted in Florida, the
shareholder unanimity requirement for such action may make it un-
available to A as a practical matter.3 However, even in Florida, A
appears to have more than one device available to him, and only one is
necessary.
There is very little caselaw in Florida on the availability of these
control devices as a means for a majority shareholder to get his way. If
the corporation operates under Florida law, this uncertainty may well
work to A's advantage. The threat of their use, coupled with B's and
C's knowledge that A will ultimately win, at least at the next annual
meeting, will probably be effective to persuade them to accede to A's
demands.
Obviously, where the initial articles and bylaws are drawn up with
provisions favoring the majority holder the success of coercive methods
can probably be assured. For example, the articles of incorporation
may expressly reserve all power over the bylaws to the shareholders or
they may attempt to allow a majority shareholder to fill newly created
board vacancies. Majority shareholder control can also prevent any
change in the articles or bylaws seeking to delete these preferential pro-
39. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2).
Except in [certain] cases . . . , no written agreement to which all shareholders
have actually assented. . . shall be invalid as between the parties thereto on the
ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto to restrict the discretion of the
board of directors in its management of the business of the corporation ...
9
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visions. If the initial bylaws provide for election of all officers by the
shareholders, the majority shareholder can guarantee his election as
president and his continued status as such. Presumably, the board will
not even have power to suspend him.4" Even if it does, this can be coun-
tered by removal of the offending members. The initial bylaws can
also provide for broad presidential powers.
The deceptively innocuous appearance of many of these provisions
should be noted. An uninitiated minority shareholder might not realize
that the effect is to place him almost completely at the mercy of any
shareholder owning a mere 51% of the voting shares. Some provisions
are so facially unfavorable that even an unsophisticated minority par-
ticipant could hardly allow their insertion in the corporate documents
unless he was content to be voiceless." It is not inconceivable, however,
that a careless investor might buy into such a corporation without
knowledge of a limit on the number of directors.
Even if the provisions guaranteeing majority absolutism are not
included in the initial articles of incorporation and bylaws, all except
the sterilization provision (which apparently requires unanimous vote
for insertion by way of amendment to the articles)43 can be added after
any annual meeting at which directors favorable to their addition are
elected. This could be accomplished even where use of such power is to
be held in abeyance until a conflict between the majority and minority
participants actually develops.
LIMITING MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER CONTROL
A number of cases throughout the country recognize a fiduciary
duty on the part of the majority shareholder to the minority sharehold-
ers." In flagrant cases of unfairness judicial intervention may limit a
majority shareholder's absolute control over the corporation where he
attempts to destroy fundamental minority rights. As to ordinary man-
agement, however, there is little that the minority can actually do to
stop the majority. True, a derivative action for waste can be brought
40. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 716(a) (McKinney's Consol. Laws of
N.Y.).
41. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.151(2), 607.154(2).
42. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.114(1), 607.107(2), 607.111(1). At least where A is not the
sole initial shareholder.
43. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2).
44. FLETCHER § 5811.
10
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against an improvident contract. 5 (For example, the contract hiring
A's son may amount to a kind of gift of the corporate assets.) The
minority can also bring an action based on majority oppression.46 The
derivative action for waste is sure to result in a pyrrhic victory since it
will not prevent reprisals by A when he immediately, or ultimately,
gains complete board control. His board can cut off all dividends, and
unless B and C are protected by employment contracts, they may be
ousted from officer and employee status. The second alternative, an
action for oppression, is almost equally sure to be futile to the minor-
ity. Even if allowed, it is likely to result in their complete ouster from
the business because dissolution will probably not produce an overly
generous financial return. It is clear, therefore, that one way or an-
other, majority voting share ownership means virtually absolute control
over corporate management notwithstanding any contrary legal rules.
Obviously, majority power need not repose in the hands of a single
shareholder. In fact, except in a corporation with only a sole share-
holder, or two equal shareholders, there will always be a majority and
a minority. Thus, in a three-person corporation in which each share-
holder owns an equal number of shares, any two together can wield the
autocratic powers described above. Where on particular decisions alle-
giances shift, with two voting one way and a different two voting to-
gether on another matter, the threat to the one who happens to be in
the minority at any particular time may not be too great. This shifting
of positions is probably what is envisioned by the participants when
they fail to enter into a unanimous shareholder agreement governing
their relations and omit minority-protective devices in the articles of
incorporation and bylaws.
During the era of goodwill when the corporation is. first formed,
the assumption that unbiased decisions will be made in the best interest
of all concerned may prove true. However, if over a period of time any
two combine regularly to form a bloc, the power of the coalition and
its consequent danger to the omitted member is obvious whether or not
the arrangement is formalized.
45. FLA. STAT. § 607.147.
46. Although not expressly authorized, as in some states (see, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. 14A § (12)(7)(c)), some jurisdictions have recognized a non-statutory right to
seek dissolution on this ground. (See Gaines v. Adler, 15 A.D. 2d 743, 223 N.Y.S. 2d
1011 (1962)).
1| :1 8
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Shareholder agreements are a means of consolidating power in a
corporation. Much like the formation of a political coalition, such
agreements may allow a combination of minorities to, in effect, control
the affairs of a corporation where the individual power of the partici-
pants, when combined under the agreement, constitutes a majority vot-
ing bloc. The effect of such agreements, therefore, may be the same as
where a single shareholder owns a majority of the corporation's shares.
Such agreements are expressly valid in Florida" and therefore clearly
enforceable. However, all shareholders who are not parties are perma-
nently relegated to a virtually powerless minority status.
THE LAWYER'S OBLIGATION
In setting up a corporation with more than a single shareholder,
the attorney must exercise special care. It is axiomatic that an attorney
cannot represent conflicting interests without full disclosure and the
consent of all parties.4 Where more than one person comes to an attor-
ney to set up a corporate business it would seem clearly improper, if
the attorney purports to act for the two or more parties involved, to set
up a typical corporate structure which allows majority control without
explaining the implications of such majority power to all involved. The
utilization of any of the additional provisions discussed above which
help to further solidify such control or enable two or more minority
participants to convert themselves, through an agreement, into a con-
trolling majority would seem to require further explanation and know-
ing acceptance of the potential dangers by all involved. Nor should an
attorney, purporting to act for all, set up a corporation and then draw
up a shareholder agreement among less than all of the people for
whom he formed that corporation without the knowledge and consent
of the excluded participants.
A majority shareholder agreement can properly be regarded as an
attack on minority interests because it consolidates almost absolute
power against them. The agreement in the famous Ringling case is typ-
47. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(1).
48. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C). Courts are taking an
increasingly strict view on the impropriety of acting for more than one party in corpo-
rate transactions. See Matter of Evans, 113 Ariz. 458, 556 P. 2d 792 (1976); Sterman
v. Cotter, 410 N.Y.S.'2d 320 (1978).
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ical.1' It was obviously directed against one of the shareholders of the
corporation. In that leading Delaware case there were three sharehold-
ers; one owned 370 of the outstanding 1000 shares, while each of the
other two held 315 shares. Since the corporation had cumulative vot-
ing, the agreement between the two smaller participants, had it been
carried out, would have given the two minority shareholders not only
control on the shareholder level, but five out of the seven director slots,
thereby securing overwhelming management control as well. In a cor-
poration with ordinary (straight) voting" they would have elected the
entire board! The combined effect was a guarantee of continued, if not
excessive, financial participation in the venture.
Obviously, this arrangement will not be considered desirable by an
excluded shareholder who will naturally fear a "freeze-out." The result
will be acrimony, if not actual litigation. Accordingly, the lawyer who
drafts such an agreement should not be the one who has set up the
corporation nor should he have previously represented the individual
against whom such an agreement is directed.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAJORITY CONTROL
As indicated above, majority shareholder dominance can be
achieved by a single majority shareholder's control over the basic cor-
porate structure at the formation of the corporation. Thus, such a
shareholder can insist on the articles of incorporation providing for a
single director. As sole director he will then have complete control. He
may even be able to "lock in" the other shareholders by imposing re-
strictions on transfers of shares. Even if he transfers shares he can
probably insist that the transferee give him an irrevocable proxy.' Cer-
tainly he can insist that the transferred shares be placed in a voting
trust of which the majority shareholder is trustee5 2 although this may
result in undesirable estate tax consequences to the majority share-
49. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del.
Ch. 318, 49 A. 2d 603 (1946), affid. 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A. 2d 441 (1947).
50. "In straight voting each share carries one vote for each matter, including one
vote for each director to be elected." H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 363 (2nd ed.
1970).
51. FLA. STAT. § 607.101(5)(e).
52. FLA. STAT. § 607.104.
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holder transferor. 53
Where, as in the Ringling situation, the exercise of majority power
depends on a combination of shareholders, the voting trust or irrevoca-
ble proxy device can also be used. However, an agreement such as the
one involved in the Ringling case is still probably the best model. That
agreement wisely includes share transfer restrictions to attempt to as-
sure that if one of the parties desires to sell his shares the other has the
opportunity to maintain the previous control power. The significant
parts of that agreement are as follows:
1. Neither party will sell any shares of stock or any voting trust
certificates in either of said corporations to any other person whatsoever,
without first making a written offer to the other party hereto of all of the
shares or voting trust certificates proposed to be sold, for the same price
and upon the same terms and conditions as in such proposed sale, and
allowing each other party a time of not less than 180 days from the date
of such written offer within which to accept same.
2. In exercising any voting rights to which either party may be
entitled by virtue of ownership of stock or voting trust certificates held
by them in either of said corporation, (sic) each party will consult and
confer with the other and the parties will act jointly in exercising such
voting rights in accordance with such agreement as they may reach with
respect to any matter calling for the exercise of such voting rights.
3. In the event the parties fail to agree with respect to any matter
covered by paragraph 2 above, the question in disagreement shall be sub-
mitted for arbitration to Karl D. Loos, of Washington, D.C. as arbitra-
tor and his decision thereon shall be binding upon the parties hereto.
Such arbitration shall be exercised to the end of assuring for the respec-
tive corporations good management and such participation therein by
the members of the Ringling family as .the experience, capacity, and
ability of each may warrant. The parties may at any time by written
agreement designate any other individual to act as arbitrator in lieu of
said Loos.
4. Each of the parties hereto will enter into and execute such vot-
ing trust agreement or agreements and such other instruments as from
time to time they deem advisable and as they may be advised by counsel
are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and objects of this agreement.
5. This agreement shall be in effect from the date hereof and shall
continue in effect for a period of ten years unless sooner terminated by
53. IRC § 2036 as amended by the Revenue Act of 1978, § 702(i).
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mutual agreement in writing by the parties hereto.
6. The agreement of April 1934 is hereby terminated.
7. This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the parties hereto
respectively. 4
In addition to the sort of provisions provided above there would
seem to be no objection to the parties' agreeing to vote for themselves
as directors by name. Agreements with such provisions were held valid
even under the restrictive New York common law.5
The share transfer restrictions could perhaps even be strengthened.
A first refusal provision as in the Ringling case, or a first option provi-
sion, might be coupled with a provision that transfer to a non-party
shall not be made without the consent of all parties to the agreement
except where the transferee agrees to become a party to the agreement
and bound by its terms." On the other hand, a provision whereby the
parties agree to cause the corporation to repurchase their shares, or
impose a corporate first option for their benefit, may be invalid as an
attempt to control the directors, and, if not all shareholders are given
equal treatment, may result in a charge of corporate waste if
effectuated. 7
The provision such as is found in the Ringling case for consulta-
tion, joint voting, and arbitration when the parties are unable to agree
on how to cast their votes would seem to be valid under Florida Stat-
utes section 607.107(1) which provides:
An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing and
signed by the parties thereto, may provide that, in exercising any voting
54. 49 A. 2d 603, 605 (1946), affd. 53 A. 2d 441, 443 (1947).
55. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
56. Although FLA. STAT. § 607.164(2) only expressly authorizes the articles of
incorporation to contain share transfer restrictions an agreement should at least be
binding on the parties. A legend should appear on the share certificates to make the
restrictions binding on transferees without knowledge. FLA. STAT. § 607.067(3). While
the corporation could be obligated to place the required legend on the shares an agree-
ment to cause it to do so might be held to bind the parties in their directorial capaci-
ties. Accordingly, they may have to assume the onus of insuring the proper legend
themselves.
57. See Borden v. Guthrie, 23 App. Div. 2d 313, 260 N.Y.S. 2d (1965), affd. 17
N.Y. 2d 571, 215 N.E. 2d 511 (1966).
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rights, the shares held by them shall be voted as therein provided, as
they may agree, or as determined in accordance with a procedure agreed
upon by them. Nothing herein shall impair the right of the corporation
to treat the shareholders of record as entitled to vote the shares standing
in their names.
This would seem to be true because of the express statutory approval
of non-unanimous agreements despite the anti-minority nature of such
agreements.
Ballantine, writing in 1946, stated:
No doubt all agreements as to voting by a shareholder should be held
contrary to public policy if the tendency of the bargain is to induce the
voter to consider, in a decision affecting the rights of others, not the
advantage of the corporation but the obtaining of advantages to himself
or some other person, such as securing employment as an officer or as a
manager for a salary."
Ballentine's statement of the law would seem to be repudiated by the
above statute. 9 Certainly the agreement should avoid reciting as con-
sideration such items as securing employment or officer status. Where
the agreement clearly indicates that the other party's vote is being
bought by a promise of favors from the corporation, the agreement will
be hard pressed to withstand attack. But where the agreement demon-
strates a result in mutual benefits to all parties through their enhanced
control position it will likely survive.
A reference to voting on shareholder matters "in accordance with
a procedure agreed upon by them"'60 would also seem to be a clear
validation of the arbitration provision when the parties are unable to
agree themselves on how their shares should be voted.
It would also seem possible to have the parties expressly agree to
give the arbitrator an irrevocable proxy to vote the unwilling party's
shares to implement his decision. The Chancellor in the Ringling case
held that that was the effect of the agreement. However, he was over-
ruled on that point by the Delaware Supreme Court which, although
upholding the validity of the agreement, merely held that the non-con-
58. H. BALLENTINE, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF CORPORATIONs 421 (rev. ed. 1946).
59. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(1).
60. Id.
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senting shareholder's shares could not be voted. The Delaware statute
was subsequently amended to authorize an irrevocable proxy where it
was coupled with an interest. Professor Ernest Folk, Rapporteur for
the committee which drafted the Delaware amendments, commenting
on that provision, stated:
Irrevocable Proxy: The revised statute has a new provision specifically
recognizing the proxy as irrevocable if the instrument so states and the
requisite interest is present. An interest in the stock or generally in the
corporation will suffice. This should be sufficient to validate an irrevoca-
ble proxy held by a creditor during the term of the loan, or by a key
officer during his employment contract period, or by a shareholder as an
ancillary feature of a voting agreement."'
The Florida Statute section 607.101(5) is clear on this point: "A proxy
which states that it is irrevocable is irrevocable when it is held by any
of the following or a nominee of any of the following: . . . [and] (e) A
person designated by or under an agreement under subsection
607.107(l)."2 Accordingly it would seem possible to provide expressly
that the arbitrator has an irrevocable proxy to vote the non-consenting
shareholder's shares in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. Cases
in a number of jurisdictions have allowed enforcement of such agree-
ments without any irrevocable proxy, using specific performance or
mandatory injunction as the remedy. 3 The grant of an irrevocable
proxy with an express consent by the parties to enforcement of the
agreement by equitable remedies might be wise.
While, as in the Ringling agreement, the promise to vote in accor-
dance with its terms is prima facie valid as to matters where the parties
are voting in their capacity as shareholders, any attempt to bind them
in their director capacities may be invalid and could possibly void the
whole agreement. Unless the bylaws already allow election of officers
by the shareholders, a clause whereby the parties agree to elect them-
selves as officers, normally a director function, may be invalid. It
would seem permissible, however, for the parites to agree to enact such
a bylaw whereby they may elect themselves as officers. Further, it may
well be improper for them to agree to vote for dissolution when they
61. E. FOLK, THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 27 (1967).
62. See text at note 47 supra.
63. See, e.g., Weil v. Beresth, 154 Conn. 12, 220 A. 2d 456 (1966).
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decide that such is desirable. A prior director vote is required for such
action. 4
Provisions in the agreement as to declaration of dividends, hiring
of non-officer personnel, or any provision under which the parties di-
rectly bind themselves on how they will vote on matters confided to the
board may well be proscribed. The reason for this limitation is the gen-
eral rule that agreements by less than all shareholders as to how they
will vote as directors are invalid. The leading case is, of course, Mc-
Quade v. Stoneham. 5 In that New York decision a majority share-
holder agreement to keep a named person as an officer at a specified
salary was held invalid since it imporperly interfered with the parties'
discretion as directors. At the time, election of officers was an exclu-
sively directorial function. Such election could not be confided in the
shareholders as is presently possible by a bylaw provision in Florida."
There was Florida authority supporting the rule that "director-
agreements" were invalid." The adoption of Florida Statute section
607.107(2) (1975), which expressly validates such interference with the
board's normal prerogatives only where an agreement authorized by all
the shareholders permits it, is an implied acceptance of the rule.
It is unlikely that such a director-sterilizing or board abolition
provision will be included in the articles of a corporation where a ma-
jority-control agreement will be utilized. If the original participants are
unwise enough to include it without assurance that they will be pro-
tected under it, the parties to the majority-control agreement may,
however, be able to take advantage of the provision by binding them-
selves to vote on matters normally confided to the directors as well.
"Indirect" control over the board can be achieved by an agree-
ment to vote to remove any directors whenever the holders of a certain
percentage of the shares covered by the agreement demand it. Al-
though the vacancies thus created may have to be filled by the board, 8
this should enable the parties to the agreement to insure that the direc-
tors they have elected under the agreement remain loyal to their wishes
64. FLA. STAT. § 607.257.
65. McQuade v. Stoneham et al., 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
66. FLA. STAT. § 607.151(1).
67. See note 3. Compare, however, Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F. 2d 390 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 831.
68. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(6).
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since their people will constitute the remaining board members. Need-
less to say, this will produce the same alienation on the part of the
ousted party to the agreement as is felt by minority non-parties.
DANGERS TO THE ARRANGEMENT
As indicated above, an agreement to consolidate and secure ma-
jority power is probably valid despite the obvious personal benefits to
its parties provided: (1) it does not appear that the vote of a party is
being bought, and (2) that it does not purport to bind the parties in
their voting as directors. Both of these possible grounds of invalidity
can probably be guarded against by proper drafting. For example, the
consideration clause and recitals should be drafted in terms of the mu-
tual benefit of the parties and the corporation. Provisions directly im-
pinging on director functions can simply be avoided. Since the law is
not completely certain as to what matters are the exclusive province of
the directors a severability clause should also be used. Such a clause
may save the balance of an agreement containing provisions later held
to be improperly director-impinging.
As is also indicated above, if the effect of action taken under the
agreement results in serious injury to minority interests, the transac-
tion69 may be upset on the ground of breach of the majority's fiduciary
duty to the minority. This result, like liability for corporate waste or
breach of duty to the corporation by the directors elected under the
agreement, is independent of the validity of the agreement and a dan-
ger which the majority and its elected directors always face.
The greatest dangers to the arrangement will probably result from
a disagreement among the parties or from the acrimonious relations
vis-a-vis the non-parties to the agreement which they will quite reason-
ably regard as directed against them. It is impossible to specify in ad-
vance exactly how the shareholder parties will vote on all of the issues
submitted to them. There are bound to be disagreements as to specific
questions as they arise. The result will be that the arbitrator will make
the ultimate decision. If too many decisions must be submitted to him
the agreement may become unworkable. Also, since the parties, once
they are elected directors, will be autonomous in that capacity," con-
69. For example, dissolution or alteration of shareholder rights.
70. As indicated above, text at note 68, provision can be made for their removal
9 I11 4:1980
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trol of the corporation's management will only be effective as long as
the parties continue to agree. There can therefore be no guarantee that
the agreement will fully achieve its ends.
Factionalization is always dangerous to the successful operation of
a business. The excluded minority, the non-parties, may well be victim-
ized by the majority or at least feel that they are. Needless to say, this
will hardly inspire them to do their best for the venture. They may
resort to litigation. Whether or not such litigation is successful it is
bound to disrupt the business and, if continued, may cause its failure.
It is this potential for built-in acrimony which is the principal objection
to a majority agreement. A unanimous shareholder agreement, exe-
cuted prior to incorporation, will, on the other hand, fix the rights and
powers of all the participants in a manner freely consented to by all of
them.
ADVICE TO PERSONS ACQUIRING A MINORITY
INTEREST IN A CLOSE CORPORATION
Professor O'Neal gives a number of examples of minority share-
holder oppression.71 A poignant one is that of a trusted employee who
is rewarded by his bosses who allow him to buy an interest in the cor-
poration."2 Understandably, the employee feels flattered at being taken
into the business, but as an employee he is reluctant to press the bosses
too much about the internal affairs of the corporation. Only too late
will he discover what it really means to be a minority shareholder. The
majority "bosses" have him almost completely at their mercy. He may
be paid no dividends on his stock, and if he objects he may even lose
his employment with the corporation. In effect, his investment may be
completely lost to him since more sophisticated investors will be un-
willing to buy his shares, especially when they know that they carry no
return and give no power to compel it. The "favored" employee is in
an especially difficult position since if he does not accept the majority's
offer he may jeopardize his employment.
The ordinary prospective purchaser of a minority interest may not
from management positions. The ensuing acrimony will, however, probably lead ulti-
mately to disruption of the management plan.
71. F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.02 (1975).
72. Id., at 41.
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be so unfortunate. He can more freely demand greater information
about the power dispersal in the corporation. Obviously, if the articles
of incorporation disclose provisions which will help to solidify majority
power the prospective purchaser should be especially cautious.
The best advice is not to buy a minority interest in a close corpo-
ration which allows absolute majority rule. This, of course, is the same
advice that would be given to an initial participant in a newly formed
close corporation. The desirability of a unanimous shareholder agree-
ment with implementing articles and bylaw provisions agreed to by all
parties must be emphasized. Where the original corporate setup does
not provide for adequate protection to minority interests the minority
investor should insist upon their adoption.
The extent of power conceded to the minority will, of course, de-
pend on the relative bargaining positions. In Florida the minority can
be given virtually absolute power through a provision in the articles of
incorporation if all shareholders agree.73 The equivalent of majority
shareholder control can be conferred on the minority through a care-
fully drafted voting trust agreement in which the minority shareholder
is made trustee and given broad discretion, and the majority sharehold-
ers deposit their shares in the trust.74 Although the trustee will be sub-
ject to fiduciary duties to the majority, the practical effect is to give
him the majority power discussed above. The trustee mninority share-
holder could also be given an irrevocable proxy to vote the shares of
the other parties to the agreement. 5 Unless the new minority holder is
indispensable, however the majority will not make such drastic
concessions.
Where the majority is unwilling to capitulate, the power of the
minority can nonetheless be augmented to a greater or lesser degree,
depending on the bargain struck. In consideration of the minority's in-
vestment, the majority can enter into an agreement including a promise
to amend the articles and bylaws where necessary: (1) To fix the num-
bers of directors at a number large enough to include a slot for the
minority;78 (2) to elect the minority shareholder, and as many of his
73. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2).
74. FLA. STAT. § 607.104.
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.107(1), 607.101(5)(e).
76. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(1).
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designees as his bargaining position demands;7 (3) to grant him a veto
over all or selected fundamental shareholder decisions through a high
vote requirement;" (4) if he is not given a majority of the board, at
least to give him a veto power through a high vote requirement for all
or selected director decisions.79 These are the same provisions which
are advisable in a unanimous shareholder agreement in order to protect
the minority (or potential minority) when any close corporation is
formed.
Where all of the present participants agree, other devices to fur-
ther protect the minority shareholder's interest may be added, such as,
cumulative voting, 0 or a recapitalization"1 where shares are made a
separate class entitled to elect a specified number of directors, 2 or by
reclassifying some majority shares into non-voting shares83 to further
magnify the power of the voting shares.
IN SUMMARY
The archetypal corporate structure gives great potential for major-
ity imposition on the non-majority shareholder in a multi-shareholder
close corporation. This potential can be taken advantage of by an
agreement which coalesces a group of minority shareholders into an
effective majority.
Because an agreement by less than all of the initial shareholders is
bound to produce acrimony, it is inadvisable to proceed in such a fash-
ion at the corporation's inception. To do so poses dangers for the
drafting attorney who purports to act for all parties and to any corpo-
rate structure seeking to facilitate the agreement. Any shareholder buy-
ing into a close corporation which makes possible majority domination
77. Valid under FLA. STAT. § 607.107(1).
78. FLA. STAT. § 607.387.
79. FLA. STAT. § 607.121.
80. FLA. STAT. § 607.097(4).
81. FLA. STAT. § 607.177(2)(f), (i), ().
82. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.164(l)(e), 607.097(1), 607.117(3). This class voting for di-
rectors is not to be confused with "classification" or staggered terms, authorized by
FLA. STAT. § 607.114(4), which may used to lengthen the terms of some directors, but
is frequently not desirable in a close corporation because of the complexity involved,
and discriminatory treatment of directors whose terms expire earlier.
83. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.044(1), 607.177(1), (2)(f), (i), ().
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should insist on changes in the basic corporate documents as protection
from the minority oppression such a majority-oriented structure
permits.
The best approach is an initial arrangement encompassed in a
unanimous shareholder pre-incorporation agreement which promises
inclusion of the necessary protective provisions for all shareholders in
the original articles of incorporation and bylaws.
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